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Plato’s Psychological Manifestations of Madness: 
A Case for a Parallel between Philosophical and 
Tyrannical Souls in The Republic
Christopher Stratman
In this paper, I will argue that there 
is a philosophically interesting 
comparison to be made between the 
philosophical and tyrannical souls 
in Plato’s Republic. I will argue for 
this point with the intent of building 
a case for a valuable insight into 
Socrates’ and thus Plato’s conception 
of the philosophical soul. Both the 
philosophical and tyrannical souls are 
dominated by a kind of obsession, or 
what I call Platonic madness; a kind 
of judicious madness in the case of 
the former and a kind of injudicious 
madness with regard to the latter. 
From this key insight we can then 
proceed in taking an essential step in 
establishing and agreeing with Plato 
that, indeed, philosophy and political-
rule ought to be fundamentally united. 
We can imagine a situation 
where Plato made the decision to 
write the Republic in the form of a 
systematic philosophy instead of a 
dialogue. I can imagine the opening 
line (the first and perhaps most 
important proposition) stating,  “Until 
philosophers rule as kings in cities 
or those who are now called kings 
and leading men genuinely and 
adequately philosophize, that is 
until political power and philosophy 
entirely coincide…cities will have 
no rest from evils…nor, I think, will 
the human race” (Republic, V 473cd). 
This paradoxical claim concerning 
the unity of philosophy and political 
rule presents for us one of the 
greatest dilemmas born from a careful 
and critical reading of the Republic. 
Nevertheless, the Republic is not in 
systematic form, yet Plato did choose 
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to begin the dialogue with these 
words “I went down” (327a). This 
suggests that perhaps he has in mind 
from the very beginning the problem 
of how philosophic and political 
unification is even possible.
It would certainly be helpful, 
concerning the dilemma of the 
philosopher-king, if we had a 
more straightforward account of 
the philosophical soul before we 
attempted to answer the question 
concerning why the philosopher 
should be compelled to rule. We do 
not, however, have direct insight into 
the philosophic soul, at least not in 
such a way as to provide the kind of 
compelling argument we might hope 
for. Of course, this is the very heart of 
the debate, being one of the reasons 
this paradox of the philosopher-king 
—as it is often understood—is among 
the most debated issues concerning 
Plato’s Republic. That is why it is the 
current task of this paper to provide 
a compelling, though indirect, insight 
into the soul of the philosopher-king; 
such a task, however, is surely much 
easier said than done. 
On one hand, Plato never gives an 
explicit account of the philosophical 
soul, or at least not an account which 
is as thoroughly developed as the 
timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and 
especially the tyrannical souls found 
in books VIII and IX of the dialogue. 
Interestingly, Socrates does give us 
a very brief look at what such a soul 
might look like at the conclusion of 
book IV. Once his argument for the 
division of the soul into three parts, 
corresponding to the division of the 
city into three parts, is first completed 
and that the rational part ought 
to rule (435c-441e), Socrates then 
proceeds to reintroduce the primary 
question he and his interlocutors 
have been thus far asking; ‘which is 
more profitable, to be just or unjust’? 
“Virtue”, Socrates states, “seems, then, 
to be a kind of health, fine condition, 
and well-being of the soul, while vice 
is disease, shameful condition, and 
weakness” (444d-e). Glaucon seems 
to be entirely satisfied with giving an 
answer to the question given Socrates’ 
tripartite city and soul; yet, Socrates 
clearly has much more to say (445a-c). 
We might wonder why Socrates still 
feels they must go on in their inquiry 
and to what extent the soul of the 
philosopher-king might be central in 
answering these questions (this point 
will need to be clarified and supported 
but it is extremely important for the 
purpose of this essay). On the other 
hand, it could be argued that this is a 
perfect example of Platonic aporia; if 
so, we might be inclined to think of 
the paradox of the philosopher-king, 
as well as Socrates’ insistence at the 
close of book IV that “we mustn’t give 
up” (445b), as something akin to a 
provocation. 
According to Mitchell Miller in his 
essay entitled, “Platonic Provocations: 
Reflections on the Soul and the 
Good in the Republic”, at its most 
fundamental level, this dialogue 
is meant “to provoke us, to move 
us beneath and beyond its own 
explicit content into philosophical 
insight of our own” (Miller 166). I 
will generously appeal to Miller’s 
insight and argument, as I take him to 
suggest, that Plato’s real genius was 
in pushing the notion of philosophical 
discourse beyond the mere surface of 
any given argument, including those 
offered by Socrates in the Republic, so 
as to move us to enter into a kind of 
dialectical investigation of the richer 
elements available in Platonic studies. 
I will appeal to Miller in order to make 
the stronger claim that we actually 
do have a practical, though indirect, 
understanding of the philosophical 
soul by the merits of closely analyzing 
the tyrannical soul and drawing from 
this analysis an important parallel. 
As I stated previously, both the 
philosophical and tyrannical souls are 
dominated by a kind of obsession, or 
Platonic madness. Again, what I mean 
here is a kind of judicious madness in 
the case of the philosophic soul and 
a kind of injudicious madness with 
regard to the tyrannical soul. But 
what I mean by madness needs to be 
made clear. Madness is essentially a 
manifestation, or so I wish to argue, 
of the development of Eros, which is 
expressed by either a kind of clear-
sighted and judicious madness or a 
blinded and injudicious madness. It will 
be shown that the kind of madness 
manifested by the Eros of either 
soul is determined by its relation to 
the Forms. The philosophical soul, 
which has a very explicit relation to 
the Forms, has a kind of madness 
which is essentially expressed as a 
kind of clear-sightedness; whereas 
the tyrannical soul, which cannot be 
said to have a relationship with the 
Forms, has a kind of madness which 
is expressed as blindness. Thus, by 
establishing the parallel between 
philosophical and tyrannical souls, 
we will have a possible explanation 
or resolution to the philosopher-king 
paradox—why the philosopher-king 
should go back down into the cave-
city in order to rule.
The structure of how I will make 
this comparison work in explaining 
why the philosopher-king should 
be compelled to rule is as follows: 
I will first attempt to illustrate how 
the very structure of the Republic 
often provides interesting interwoven 
themes or significant parallels which 
are not accidental. They provide 
both a deeper understanding of the 
many complex issues as they appear 
in the dialogue as well as significant 
points of aporia. From this general 
acknowledgement of Plato’s use of 
parallels, I will then build the parallel 
between philosophical and tyrannical 
souls using the notion of judicious 
madness and injudicious madness as 
essentially a manifestation of Eros. By 
doing so I will then elaborate on the 
nature of the philosophical soul as 
it can be discovered drawn from the 
parallel mentioned above and Eros 
as it functions both in the Republic as 
well as its relation to other Platonic 
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dialogues, specifically the Phaedrus. 
Finally, after these crucial points 
have been established, I hope to 
show that the basic reason why the 
philosopher-king should return to 
the cave/city in order to rule as king 
is not because there is a desire to do 
so, but because the philosopher, due 
to judicious madness, is able to clearly 
see and understands that, given the 
circumstances, going back down into 
the cave/city in order to rule is what is 
best for everyone.
When Socrates demands at the 
end of Book III that the guardian 
class, whom he had just established 
as being the rightful overseers of 
the just city, should live austerely, 
abstaining from touching or being 
at all associated with gold or silver 
and that they should have no 
private property at all beyond what 
is absolutely necessary (416cd), he 
is generally setting the stage for an 
important objection. Yet, if the task 
which Socrates is charged with is to 
prove that justice is always best for 
either an individual or a city (that is to 
say that it is always to your advantage 
to be just and the just person or city 
is always the happiest or better off), 
then why would Socrates here argue 
that the guardian class must not 
have anything which might generally 
be considered, both by Socrates’ 
interlocutors as well as perhaps 
ourselves, as material wealth?
Interestingly, the point Socrates 
seems to be making is that such an 
austere life for the guardians would 
actually “save both themselves and the 
city” (417a). Indeed, the description 
he gives of a guardian class that is 
allowed such adornments sounds 
very much like an early description of 
the tyrant, which he does not directly 
mention until much later in Book VIII 
and IX. Socrates states that if they 
do acquire wealth for themselves, 
“[T]hey’ll spend their whole lives 
hating and being hated, plotting and 
being plotted against, more afraid of 
internal than external enemies, and 
they’ll hasten both themselves and 
the whole city to almost immediate 
ruin” (417b). The point which I 
want to make in considering this 
foreshadowed description of the 
dangers of attaining private material 
wealth by the ruling guardian class 
is that one of the key aspects of the 
Republic is the way in which Plato 
weaves the many themes of the 
dialogue together in such a way that it 
is possible to find descriptions, of the 
tyrant for example, woven into some 
of the other vital moments such as 
this. By using elements of interwoven 
themes, vital foreshadowing and 
parallels, we can lay the foundation 
for a parallel between the 
philosophical and tyrannical souls. 
First, however, let us examine further 
some of the important ways in which 
Plato utilizes these elements generally 
throughout the Republic.
Kenneth Dorter, in the very 
opening lines of the introduction of 
his book titled The Transformations of 
Plato’s Republic, states that:
The Republic is a book of contrasts, built 
on oppositions between the just and 
the unjust life, rationality and appetites, 
necessary and unnecessary appetites, 
being and becoming, knowledge and 
opinion, originals and images, blindness 
to dark and blindness to light, and the 
evolution and devolution of political 
and psychological constitutions, among 
others (Dorter 1).
What strikes me as an obvious 
point of emphasis here is his 
immediate observation that not only 
is the dialogue one of oppositions, but 
his descriptions of blindness both to 
the darkness as well as blindness to 
the light as being in opposition. We 
might wonder if these sight related 
oppositions could be construed as I 
have suggested already: judicious and 
injudicious madness?  
 
Blindness to dark = Judicious 
Madness (the soul in relation to the 
forms). The Philosopher-king can 
see clearly due to a kind of judicious 
madness that is like a blindness to 
the dark or blindness to the inability 
to see clearly.
 
Blindness to light = Injudicious 
Madness (the soul without relation 
to the forms). The Tyrant cannot see 
clearly due to a kind of injudicious 
madness that is like a blindness to 
the light or blindness to the ability 
to see clearly. 
This dual nature of blindness 
will be further developed as the 
cornerstone of my argument. It 
therefore seems fitting to begin with 
Dorter’s essential description of 
oppositions and parallels. There are 
a number of ways in which Dorter 
spells out these oppositions; as the 
title of his book implies, his focus is 
primarily concerned with the different 
forms of transformations the Republic 
takes. Therefore, I will briefly examine 
some of these oppositions and 
transformations in light of our larger 
task at hand.
Dorter describes the Republic 
as having a kind of arch structure 
to it, which helps define the many 
transformations within it. He states, 
“[N]ot only are the themes of Book 
1 also adumbrations of the themes 
of the dialogue as a whole, but Book 
1 also functions as a symmetrical 
counterpart to Book 10, together 
with it framing the Republic’s arch 
structure” (Dorter 6). He goes on 
to argue that the symmetry found 
throughout the entire dialogue has 
structure which both, metaphorically 
speaking, ascends and descends; 
again he claims that it “extends in 
both directions the ascending and 
descending trajectory noesis (511b-
c) generally, rising to and returning 
from noesis as noesis rises and returns 
within itself, even as in other respects 
the dialogue continually moves 
forward in its inquiry” (7). Dorter 
seems to be indicating that as the 
inquiry into justice, as well as the 
many other modes and themes which 
are developed within the discussions 
held between Socrates and his 
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interlocutors, evolves, the symmetry 
between the many interwoven topics, 
such as justice and the good, evolve 
as well. This symmetry, I suggest, 
should be kept in mind as a part of 
the background of our analysis as 
we continue to build a case for the 
parallel between philosophic and 
tyrannical souls. 
After describing what is perhaps 
the most well known of Plato’s similes, 
the cave, as “not only a general 
allusion, but a precise reflection on 
the dialogue’s beginning at the heart 
of the cave” and then suggesting how 
we might interpret Plato as using this 
famous simile as an image of what the 
entire dialogue is doing, “the progress 
of the prisoners who ascend through 
stages to a vision of the ultimate 
principle and, transformation by that 
vision, return to the cave to benefit 
their successors,” Dorter leads into the 
dialectical nature of these oppositions 
and transformative elements within 
the text. He argues that:
Within this larger structure local 
structural principles permeate the 
argument at every level. The apparent 
casualness of the conversations is 
constantly underpinned by ordering 
patterns so that the narrative becomes 
an image of the world itself, in which the 
apparently random flow of becoming 
implicitly exhibits the ordered rationality 
of being (9616b-617c) (Dorter 8).
The key point here is that Plato 
seems to be working on a much 
more philosophically interesting level, 
far more complex and challenging 
than what might simply be noticed 
on the mere surface reading of the 
text. Within these complexities of 
oppositions and transformations 
which Dorter has illustrated is an 
implicit argument, or so I wish to 
suggest, that will provide us the 
ability to make clear the parallel 
between philosopher and tyrant. This 
argument, which was alluded by way 
of an early description of the tyrant, 
is that depth of the dialogue allows 
us to see important points (such as 
an important glimpse of the nature 
of the tyrant’s soul) prior to actually 
describing it; this same quality, I 
submit, can be said concerning the 
philosophical soul as well. Dorter’s 
understanding of these transitions 
within the Republic helps justify this 
claim; it opens to us the possibility 
of going beyond the text in order to 
see where the parallel can be found. 
With these basic examples in mind, 
let us now turn to what I feel is a 
much more explicit early example of 
a parallel between philosophical and 
tyrannical souls.
The example I wish to elaborate 
on can be thought of as either the 
friend-enemy parallel or the dog-wolf 
parallel. In a discussion with Glaucon 
in Book II concerning the need for the 
guardian class to be both spirited as 
well as gentle, Socrates suggests that 
a well-trained dog is a good model for 
a “well-born youth” and that, because 
a well-trained dog seems to have 
both intelligence and courage, the 
guardians of the city should share 
these same qualities (375a-c). If a 
dog were not by nature courageous 
without the correct intellect, there 
would be a serious problem. That 
is to say, if the guardian class is by 
nature like a dog then its spirited 
nature could potentially turn on the 
citizens; but as a well-trained dog 
that has both knowledge and courage 
it presumably would not (375c). Yet, 
this then implies a further problem 
(which is here only addressed as 
a micro version of what will later 
become the problem of the possibility 
of the just city coming into existence 
at all). The question which is asked 
at this point is how one could unite 
within a guardian both the necessary 
spirited quality of a well-trained dog 
and a gentle quality which will ensure 
that the guardian never turns on the 
citizens (376c). 
The solution which Socrates puts 
forward at this point is simply to look 
closer at what a well-trained dog 
is like; he claims such an animal is 
“gentle as can be to those he’s used 
to and knows, but the opposite to 
those he doesn’t know” and again he 
states, “[W]hen a dog sees someone 
it doesn’t know, it gets angry before 
anything bad happens to it. But when 
it knows someone, it welcomes him, 
even if it has never received anything 
good from him” (375e-376a). It is 
at this point that Socrates finally 
begins to draw out the needed details 
concerning a philosopher’s soul; it 
seems rather striking, I would suggest, 
that he then uses the comparison of a 
well-trained dog.
He suggests to Glaucon that this 
odd quality concerning dogs is “truly 
philosophical” and claims that the 
reason this is so is due to the fact 
that a dog “judges anything it sees 
to be either an enemy, on no other 
basis than that it knows the one 
and doesn’t know the other” and 
further implies a dog then is “a lover 
of learning, if it defines what is its 
own and what is alien to it in terms 
of knowledge and ignorance” (376b). 
So then it would seem that the need 
to know one’s friends from one’s 
enemies is an essential part of what it 
takes to be a philosopher, as Socrates 
suggests. But perhaps the real point 
of emphasis here is that “knowledge 
produces gentleness and ignorance 
produces harshness” (Rosen 85). As 
it relates to the two kinds of Platonic 
madness that I have thus far discussed, 
judicious and injudicious, clearly 
we could think of the well-trained 
dog as having a kind of judicious 
madness. Moreover, it seems to me 
that when Socrates describes these 
characteristics as “truly philosophical” 
(376b) he is setting the stage for 
judicious madness. 
Aside from the overall topic 
which Socrates and his partners 
are working through at this point 
(which is another example of Plato’s 
use of foreshadowing, in this case 
of the solution to the third wave of 
laughter which is not addressed until 
later in Book V), we can see from this 
discussion “a link between philosophy 
and the definition of justice as doing 
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good to one’s friend and harm to 
one’s enemies” (85, 86). We can now 
use this idea of well-trained dog as a 
lover of wisdom—a philosopher who 
possesses a kind of judicious madness 
that allows it to know his enemy 
and friend—to see how this, in a 
pendulum fashion, can be compared 
to the much later description of the 
tyrant as a wolf.
It seems completely reasonable 
to suggest that if a philosopher is 
like a well-trained dog because of its 
knowledge concerning friends and 
enemies, then the exact opposite—the 
very antithesis—should hold, we 
might expect, for a non-domesticated 
wild version of a dog; that is to say a 
wolf. As such, we could then conceive 
of the wolf, regarding it as the 
antithesis of the well-trained dog, as 
a perfect representation of the tyrant; 
that is if there is indeed a parallel 
between the two. 
In Book VII, after Socrates has 
proceeded through the devolution 
of each city and the corresponding 
constitutions of each soul and finally 
gets to the tyrannical city, he makes 
a very insightful claim about this 
particular city and soul. He compares 
the “beginning of the transformation 
from leader of the people to tyrant” to 
“the man in the story told about the 
temple of the Lycaean Zeus (Zeus the 
wolf-god)” (565d). The imagery which 
Socrates uses here is quite explicit and 
it seems to parallel the description of 
the philosopher as a well-trained dog, 
especially when you consider that one 
of the most basic differences between 
a dog and a wolf is simply the fact 
that one is domesticated or educated 
properly to have knowledge of friend 
and enemy whereas the wolf is a wild 
animal with no formal education. 
Socrates’ description is quite powerful 
so I have chosen to quote him at 
length here:
…anyone who tastes the one piece of 
human innards that’s chopped up with 
those of other sacrificial victims must 
inevitably become a wolf…doesn’t 
the same happen with a leader of the 
people who dominates a docile mob 
and doesn’t restrain himself from 
spilling kindred blood? He brings 
someone to trial on false charges and 
murders him (as tyrants so often do), 
and, by thus blotting out a human 
life, his impious tongue and lips taste 
kindred citizens blood…isn’t a man like 
that inevitably fated either to be killed 
by his enemies or to be transformed 
from a man into a wolf by becoming a 
tyrant? (565d-e).
This is the first explicit parallel 
which I wish to emphasize, but it 
is only a partial description of the 
much fuller account I will develop; it 
should be clear at this point that the 
key element in this example is tied 
to the fact that a dog is domesticated 
or well trained whereas the wolf 
is not. The connection to be made 
between philosopher and tyrant is 
that the former has a very specific 
kind of education, in the Forms, which 
produces judicious madness, whereas 
the later lacks this relation to the Forms, 
which produces injudicious madness. 
We can now move on to another 
aspect which will help build a case 
for a parallel between philosophical 
and tyrannical souls derived from the 
consideration that a tyrant lives life as 
if in a dream whereas the philosopher 
is truly awake. Put another way, the 
philosopher has authentic knowledge, 
which leads to knowing what to do in 
any given situation. The tyrant, on the 
other hand, has not only mere opinion, 
but the kind which is inherently self-
destructive. Furthermore, examining 
how Socrates describes the difference 
between living life as if in a dream 
vs. living life fully awake will help 
identify who the philosopher is; this 
will then be applied to our analysis of 
philosopher and tyrant.
It is in Book V that Socrates 
fully introduces one of the central 
paradoxes of the Republic which I 
have already described as the paradox 
of the philosopher-king; so that 
it is vividly clear this paradox can 
be thought of as the unification of 
philosophy and political activity or why 
the philosopher who has communion 
with the Forms should go back down 
into the cave to rule as king. In his 
book, simply titled Philosopher-kings 
the Argument of Plato’s Republic, C.D.C. 
Reeve describes the identification of 
the philosopher, here in Book V as 
being identical to his name; he states 
that, “[T]he key to his identity lies in 
his name—wisdom-lover (475b8-9). 
Because he is a lover, he loves all of 
what he loves…Because it is wisdom 
he loves, he must love everything 
that one can learn or come to know” 
(Reeve 191). Now Glaucon seems 
unsatisfied with this relatively broad 
description of a philosopher who is 
a lover of wisdom; he responds to 
Socrates by saying that:
Then many strange people will be 
philosophers, for the lovers of sights 
seem to be included, since they take 
pleasure in learning things, and the 
lovers of sounds are very strange people 
to include as philosophers, for they 
would never willingly attend a serious 
discussion or spend their time that way, 
yet they run around to all the Dionysiac 
festivals, omitting none, whether in 
cities or villages, as if their ears were 
under contract to listen to every chorus. 
Are we to say that these people—and 
those who learn similar things or petty 
crafts—are philosophers? (475d).
Intuitively it would appear as 
though Glaucon is perfectly justified 
in objecting to Socrates’ initial 
description of a philosopher. Socrates 
seems to recognize this apparent 
counter intuitiveness and clarifies his 
original position; he says that these 
people who chase after sights and 
sounds are not true philosophers 
“but they are like philosophers” 
(475e). The point which Socrates is 
making is that the main difference 
between the strange people Glaucon 
describes and the true philosophers 
or lovers of wisdom is concerned 
48   |   JOURNAL OF undergraduate research
with the difference between the kind 
of knowledge they have—opinion 
or true knowledge of the Forms 
themselves. 
Socrates then describes the lovers 
of sights and sounds or someone 
who “believes in beautiful things, but 
doesn’t believe in the beautiful itself 
and isn’t able to follow anyone who 
could lead him to the knowledge of it.” 
He says that such a person “is living 
in a dream rather than a wakened 
state” (476c). Glaucon begins to agree 
without further objections. Socrates 
points out that “someone who, to 
take the opposite case, believes in the 
beautiful itself, can see both it and 
the things that participate in it and 
doesn’t believe that the participants 
are it or that it itself is the participants” 
and asks “is he living in a dream or is 
he awake?” (476c-d). Glaucon again 
agrees with Socrates that such a 
person is “very much awake” (476d). 
It should be noted that here the 
discussion concerning a lover of sights 
and sounds, who is like a philosopher 
but who is also different in that they 
are living a dream and do not have 
true knowledge, rather only opinion, 
such a person is not identified directly 
as a tyrant—we should consider such 
a person as being anyone who does 
not have knowledge of the Forms. 
Nevertheless, the interesting point, 
which I will attempt to examine next, 
is the idea of a person who is living 
life as if in a dream and how that does 
in fact relate to the tyrant.
Turning to Book IX, when 
Socrates begins to directly describe 
the tyrannical soul, he examines the 
desires of the tyrant (571a). He claims 
that we all seem to have unnecessary 
desires which are lawless, “but they 
are held in check by the laws and 
by the better desires in alliance with 
reason” (571b). The desires he is 
referring to here are:
Those that are awakened in sleep, when 
the rest of the soul—the rational, gentle, 
and ruling part—slumber. Then the 
beastly and savage part, full of food and 
drink, cast off sleep and seeks to find a 
way to gratify itself. You know that there 
is nothing it won’t dare to do at such 
a time, free of all control by shame or 
reason. It doesn’t shrink from trying to 
have sex with a mother, as it supposes, 
or with anyone else at all, whether man, 
god, or beast. It will commit any foul 
murder, and there is no food it refuses 
to eat. In a word, it omits no act of folly 
or shamelessness (571c).
Once Socrates has introduced 
the idea that there are such lawless 
desires in perhaps even the most just 
person while they are asleep, he then 
goes on to describe what happens 
when someone such as a tyrant lives 
life chasing after such lawless desires 
which are normally in check but 
have now become freed and able to 
be expressed.
He describes the tyrant as having 
implanted within him “a powerful 
erotic love, like a great winged 
drone, to be the leader of those idle 
desires that spend whatever is at 
hand” (572e). With this description 
of erotic love as motivating force 
within the tyrant, he then claims that 
those “other desires…buzz around 
the drone” and make it increase in 
size and intensity; “making it grow 
as large as possible, they plant the 
sting of longing in it” (573a). So 
we have unnecessary and lawless 
desires which have become freed 
from a dreaming psyche and an 
erotic love which has been planted 
within the soul of the tyrant and, 
when it becomes enlarged, creates 
what Socrates describes as a “sting of 
longing,” presumably referring to the 
intensity of the lawless desires within 
the tyrant’s soul. He then adds to this 
what is perhaps the most significant 
description for the argument I wish 
to put forth; he describes the tyrant’s 
soul as having madness as its leader 
and bodyguard. “[T]his leader of the 
soul,” he claims, “adopts madness as 
its bodyguard and becomes frenzied. 
If it finds any beliefs or desires in the 
man that are thought to be good or 
that still have some shame, it destroys 
them and throws them out, until 
it’s purged him of moderation and 
filled him with imported madness” 
(573a-b). He states that this too is 
why “erotic love has long been called 
a tyrant” (See Book I: 329c) (573b). 
Socrates summarizes what has just 
been confirmed by Glaucon that, 
“a man becomes tyrannical in the 
precise sense of the term when either 
his nature or his way of life or both of 
them together make him drunk, filled 
with erotic desire, and mad” (573c).
The task now has turned to 
describing the tyrannical life; the 
issue to be made clear is not only 
that the tyrannical life is unpleasant 
(this is Socrates’ main argument). I 
submit that the tyrannical life, driven 
by the erotic passion and desires 
which have become manifested 
as a kind of madness, has become 
blinded to what is best and good. 
Socrates suggests that the tyrannical 
life, driven by erotic love, spends all 
his money, thus “when everything is 
gone” all the lawless desires that are 
now within him demand even more; 
“driven by the stings of the other 
desires and especially by erotic love 
itself (which leads all of them as its 
bodyguard)” he will “become frenzied 
and look to see who possesses 
anything that he could take, by either 
deceit or force” (573e). The tyrannical 
life is one of a kind of madness which 
is expressed as something akin to an 
obsession which leads this person 
to do all kinds of evil actions; as 
Socrates elegantly claims:
Now, however, under the tyranny of 
erotic love, he has permanently become 
while awake what he used to become 
occasionally while asleep, and he won’t 
hold back from any terrible murder or 
from any kind of food or act. But, rather, 
erotic love lives like a tyrant within him 
in complete anarchy and lawlessness 
as his sole ruler, and drives him, as if 
he were a city, to dare anything that 
will provide sustenance for itself and 
the unruly mob around it…Isn’t this 
the life that a tyrannical man leads? 
(574e-575a).
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Again, Socrates declares that 
“someone with a tyrannical nature 
lives his whole life without being 
friends with anyone” (576a). This can 
be viewed in relation to the parallel 
mentioned previously concerning 
the philosopher as a well-trained 
dog who is able to recognize and has 
knowledge of the difference between 
friend and enemy, whereas the wolf, 
who is really a tyrant, cannot. The 
tyrannical person, says Socrates, is 
“the worst type of man: His waking 
life is like the nightmare we described 
earlier…the longer he remains tyrant, 
the more like the nightmare he 
becomes” (576b). 
Previously, I stated that the 
madness, which is expressed as 
an uncontrollable obsession for 
the lawless desires and will stop at 
nothing to satisfy them, is also a kind 
of blindness; it was for this reason 
that I described the madness of the 
tyrannical soul as injudicious madness. 
The relevant question that now 
applies is whether or not Socrates 
actually makes the same connection? 
Perhaps it would be a better reason 
if the blindness which is connected 
to the madness of a tyrannical soul, 
injudicious madness, results not only 
in potentially being unable to know 
what is best, but, more specifically, in 
the least pleasant life. In this way it 
could be argued that the tyrannical 
life is by far the most unjust and what 
Socrates does describe as “totally 
opposite” from the philosophical soul 
or city ruled by a king (576d). With 
that said, it seems important to have 
a better understanding of how the 
tyrannical soul becomes maddened 
in such a way as to become blinded 
to what is actually good. For it would 
seem unrealistic to suggest that once 
the erotic desires have become freed 
within his soul they automatically 
or magically are expressed as a kind 
of blindness. Rather, I suggest that 
the process of becoming blind to 
what is good is a process which 
can be discovered and described by 
looking closely at the devolution of 
constitutions in Book VIII.
In a very insightful essay titled 
“Degenerate regimes in Plato’s 
Republic,” Zena Hitz recognizes 
that as the process of degeneration 
occurs there is a struggle between 
reason and the appetites. She states 
that “[R]eason is not dispensed with 
in the degenerate regimes; rather, it 
pursues inadequate objects. Rather 
than seeking what is genuinely good, 
degenerate reason pursues certain 
shadowy appearances of the good; 
honor, constraint, and lawfulness” 
(Hitz 113). Her description of 
“shadowy appearances of the good” is 
then employed in each constitution 
which results in, according to my 
interpretation of her argument, a 
further development of falsehood, 
deception and, ultimately, blindness; 
she claims that, “love of wealth in 
the timocracy is the engine of its 
decline” and that the “love of wealth 
is secret” (114). This secretiveness 
should be considered, according to 
my interpretation, the beginning of 
the coming of blindness which will be 
maximized by the tyrant.
What about the other constitutions, 
one might wonder? How are they 
involved? Consider the Oligarchy 
and how they “impoverish their 
subjects” as Hitz claims; “under the 
guise of restraining petty injustice 
such as thievery and temple-robbing 
(552d), the oligarchic rulers maintain 
a legal structure which enriches 
them” (Hitz 116). Going on, she 
argues that these rulers must have an 
appearance of being just, or at least 
trustworthy, in order to make loans 
which will increase their wealth (116). 
Thus, there remains a kind of false 
impression which could be taken 
simply as a secretive reversal of virtue, 
i.e. honesty particularly between 
friends and fellow citizens. This mere 
façade of virtue of honesty is, as it 
were, a furthering of blindness, or so I 
wish to claim.
The democratic constitution is 
a bit different, for there remains “a 
certain kind of restraint and with 
the projection of a certain kind of 
appearance” which according to 
Hitz, “can be seen in part by looking 
backward from the tyrant” (Hitz 116). 
It seems as though the democratic 
constitution also has something akin 
to secretiveness. If we consider that in 
the tyrannical soul the lawless desires 
are fully realized and expressed as 
a kind of blinding manifestation of 
madness, “[T]he democratic character 
settles a compromise between his 
necessary and unnecessary appetites, 
under something like a law of 
equality (572b10-d3). In doing so, the 
democratic character imagines he is 
being moderate”; and it is here that 
we can see how “the democrat has no 
real grounds to oppose the pursuit 
of lawless desires” (117). Indeed, one 
could view the democrat as being 
quite similar to the other constitutions 
in that, “like the oligarch and the 
timocrat” the democrat inevitably 
“nurtures appetites hostile to his 
own values while pretending to 
himself—and perhaps to others—that 
he is in fact safe from them” (117). 
This is clearly a case of both self-
deception and secretiveness; but it is 
not yet maximal. Hitz’s insight here, 
however, shows that these shadow 
virtues, in relation to the devolution 
of constitutions, can be considered as 
proof of a sort of self-blinding quality; 
ultimately this blindness, I submit, 
will be completed in the tyrannical 
soul as a kind of psychological 
manifestation of madness actively 
expressed in the soul of the tyrant.
It is interesting to notice, prior 
to moving on, that Plato seems to 
have had a great appreciation for this 
notion of blindness, which should be 
understood in terms of the inevitable 
consequences of hubris or selfishness. 
In the Ion, for example, Socrates 
attempts to describe a passage from 
Homer, in this case from the Odyssey, 
which is a worthy example of good 
poetry which has been inspired by 
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the gods. He chooses to describe the 
scene where Theoclymenus warns the 
suitors of their self-deception: 
Ah, wretched men, what bane is this ye 
suffer? Shrouded in night.
Are your heads and your faces and your 
limbs below,
And kindled is the voice of wailing, and 
cheeks are wet with tears.
And the porch is full of ghosts, the hall 
is full of them,
Hastening hellwards beneath the 
gloom; and the sun
Has perished out of heaven, and an evil 
mist enfolds the world (Ion 539).
How brilliantly this passage 
suggests that blindness in the form 
of a gloomy evil mist has completely 
encompassed the minds of the suitors; 
might we extrapolate from this just a 
bit and consider a very similar mist of 
blindness is what has been planted 
in the soul of the tyrant and become 
manifested in the form of injudicious 
madness? I suggest such a connection 
is quite reasonable, especially given 
the appreciation Plato seemed to 
have both for Homer (to some extent) 
and for Homer’s hero Odysseus (See 
Republic X: 595b and 620c).
Until this point, one might object, 
all I have merely been building is 
a case for a parallel between the 
tyrannical soul as it exists at different 
times and for different reasons 
throughout the Republic, but not a 
parallel between the philosophical 
soul and the tyrannical soul. My 
response would simply be to grant 
this difficulty; that is, as long as it is 
also granted that there is indeed a 
philosophically interesting parallel to 
be made between the different modes 
of presentation the tyrannical soul 
comes to us throughout the course 
of the dialogue. Therefore, I will now 
turn my attention to what is required 
to make this parallel explicit.
Nevertheless, there is indeed 
a very important aspect of the 
tyrannical soul which can be 
considered as a psychological 
manifestation of madness. And this 
madness is essentially born from 
within an energizing force of the tyrant’s 
erotic love and desires—ultimately 
making the soul blinded to what is 
best and good and thus a kind of 
injudicious madness. We can now ask 
the very important question what 
does the madness of the tyrant have to 
do with the madness of philosopher? To 
answer this question we need to first 
see what, if anything, the Republic 
has to say about the philosopher with 
regard to madness.
In Book VI, after Socrates has 
shown that only philosophers have 
adequate knowledge to rule the 
just city, we find an objection which 
does indicate something about how 
philosophers are perceived by most 
people; “the greatest number” of 
them we are told “become cranks” 
and even “vicious, while those who 
seem completely decent are rendered 
useless to the city because of the 
studies you recommend” (487d). 
Interestingly, Socrates does not seem 
to disagree with such a claim, which 
only adds to the problem of the 
philosopher-king paradox; “How, then, 
can it be true to say that there will 
be no end to evils in our cities until 
philosophers—people we agree are 
to be useless—rule in them?” (487e). 
Socrates, in his usual fashion, gives a 
simile to help describe the situation 
to his audience; the basic force of the 
image he uses, the ship of state, is that 
those who dismiss the true ruler of a 
ship do not recognize or understand 
the purpose of ruling. Socrates states 
that they:
…don’t understand that a true captain 
must pay attention to the seasons of the 
year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and 
all that pertains to his craft, if he’s really 
to be the ruler of the ship. And they 
[those who dismiss him] don’t believe 
there is any craft that would enable him 
to determine how he should steer the 
ship, whether the others want him to 
or not, or any possibility of mastering 
this alleged craft or of practicing it at 
the same time as the craft of navigation. 
Don’t you think that the true captain 
will be called a real stargazer, a babbler, 
and a good-for-nothing by those who 
sail in ships governed in that way in 
which such things happen? (488d-e).
Here we have a slight indication 
into how we might consider a 
philosopher as also having a kind of 
madness, one which is here described 
as stargazing, etc. (I will come back 
to this point in a moment). First, 
however, there is another important 
point which Socrates makes following 
this passage which needs to be 
addressed in order to see the full force 
of my argument at its conclusion.
After agreeing that the philosopher 
or true captain of a ship is considered 
by most people as completely useless, 
he then states something rather 
remarkable. He claims that it is not 
right for one who is a ruler to beg to 
rule; that is to say “[I]t isn’t for the 
ruler, if he’s truly any use, to beg the 
others to accept his rule” (489c). This 
remark, it seems to me, is strikingly 
similar to what he states much earlier 
in the dialogue concerning who the 
best ruler is:
…good people won’t be willing to rule for 
the sake of either money or honor. They 
don’t want to be paid wages openly for 
ruling and get called hired hands, nor to 
take them in secret from their rule and 
be called thieves. And they won’t rule for 
the sake of honor, because they aren’t 
ambitious honor-lovers. So, if they’re 
to be willing to rule, some compulsion 
or punishment must be brought to 
bear on them—perhaps that is why it is 
thought shameful to seek to rule before 
one is compelled to. Now the greatest 
punishment, if one isn’t willing to rule, 
is to be ruled by someone worse than 
oneself. And I think that it’s fear of this 
that makes decent people rule when 
they do (347b-c).
This claim, of course, was stated 
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way back in Book I, but it has a 
great deal of importance here as our 
argument proceeds to its end. We 
shall see how it impacts the paradox 
of the philosopher-king once we 
have further examined the relevance 
of madness with regard to the 
philosophical soul.
As I have mentioned previously, 
there is no good description of the 
philosophical soul in the Republic, 
but Plato does provide a basic 
understanding of the philosopher as 
a lover of wisdom. I will turn now 
to a very brief summation of the 
relation between Eros and madness as 
Socrates describes it in the Phaedrus; 
there Socrates gives two speeches 
describing the nature of love (Eros) 
in connection to madness. In the first 
speech we see Eros as an energizing 
force which is manifested as a kind 
of madness and can be conceived 
of as the kind of madness we saw 
related to the tyrannical soul, a kind of 
injudicious madness.
The speeches Socrates gives are 
meant to describe the role Eros plays 
between the older lover and a beloved 
younger boy. In the first speech, 
Socrates claims that “the older, stays 
with the younger, and will not leave 
him, day nor night, if he can help it; 
constraint and mad desire drive him 
onwards; the sting of love allures him 
with the gift of constant joy in seeing, 
hearing, touching the beloved…” 
(Phaedrus: 240). Here it seems that the 
older lover, driven by a sensual, lustful, 
erotic and bodily Eros, has become 
utterly obsessed with the beloved and 
this obsession turns out to be very 
harmful to the beloved. Socrates says 
to the young boy, “you must know the 
fondness of the lover, what it is. Its 
nature is not that of kindness. No, it 
comes to satisfy its appetite, to devour 
you as a sort of food: Like as wolves 
adore a lamb, thus do lovers love a 
boy” (241). Yet, this speech turns out 
to be an inadequate description of 
Eros and Socrates is compelled by 
his conscience, or perhaps fear of 
offending the gods, to recant and give 
a second more adequate speech.
In his second speech, Socrates 
now declares that instead of madness 
always leading to unsound and 
harmful judgment he instead says that 
“in reality the greatest blessings come 
to us through madness, for there is a 
madness that is given from on high” 
(244). Again Socrates praises this 
divine kind of madness saying:
Where the direst maladies and woes 
have fallen upon certain houses through 
ancestral guilt, there madness has 
intervened, and with oracular power 
has found a way of deliverance for 
those who are in need, taking refuge in 
supplications to the gods and worship 
of them; and thus, through cleansing 
and mystic rites, he who has part in 
this madness finds safety now and for 
the future; to him who is rightly mad, 
rightly possessed, the madness brings 
release from his present ills (244).
We can begin to see at this point, 
even with this very brief reference 
to the Phaedrus that there is another 
kind of madness—a judicious madness 
and it is precisely this divine and 
judicious version which I wish to 
associate with the philosophical soul.
Simply put, the soul of the 
philosopher is paralleled by the 
soul of the tyrant exactly at this 
point. The philosophical soul is 
maddened and obsessed with what 
its nature corresponds to, namely 
the Forms; this enables it to have 
sound judgment and understanding. 
Moreover this judicious quality of 
the philosophical soul is essentially 
one of clear-sightedness, being able 
to know what is best and good in 
any given situation and thus moved 
by the energizing force of Eros, this 
judicious madness is able to “bring 
release from…present ills” (244). On 
the other hand, the tyrannical soul, as 
it has been previously demonstrated, 
is maddened and obsessed with what 
its nature corresponds to, namely 
its own lawless erotic desires; this 
then prevents it from having sound 
judgment and understanding.  
Now that this parallel is complete 
and we can see, to some degree, what 
the philosophical soul is like, we 
are in a far better position to give a 
reasonable solution to the paradox of 
the philosopher-king. Why should the 
philosopher go back down into the 
cave-city and rule?
After Socrates has finished 
describing the unforgettable simile of 
the cave in Book VII, and states that 
the philosophers must not remain 
with the Forms forever but must 
be compelled “through persuasion 
or compulsion” ( 519e) to rule the 
city, he makes what is perhaps the 
most difficult yet important point; 
he suggests that true philosophers 
“despise political rule” more than 
anyone else (521b). This is the main 
point my argument has come to.
In sum, the philosophers will 
not want to rule. They, of all people, 
will want to rule the least. However, 
because the philosophical soul is 
characterized by a judicious madness 
which enables clear-sightedness, 
the true philosopher will know and 
understand best that, given the 
situation, what is best for themselves 
as well as the happiness of the city as 
a whole is for them to rule the city as 
philosopher-kings. Moreover, it would 
be wrong to consider Socrates’ remarks 
here as being mistaken or inauthentic. 
When Socrates argues that the 
philosophers will not want to rule the 
city we must take him seriously.
If my interpretation of Plato here 
is correct, then it would be a mistake 
to argue, as some tend to do, that the 
philosophers actually do want to go 
back down into the cave in order to 
rule, despite their desire to be with 
the Forms forever. No, in comparison 
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to the madness which they possess, 
and in conjunction with their 
obsession of the Forms (which is the 
only thing the philosophers are really 
concerned with) they will not want to 
rule. They will want to stay in the light 
of the Forms, forever learning; for 
they are by nature lovers of wisdom 
and are maddened by their desire of 
the Forms. However, and this is the 
central point, this same madness is 
what allows them to see clearly or 
judge rightly that the situation calls 
for them to rule, though they really 
do not want to. This is why Socrates 
says very early on in Book I that the 
best kind of rulers (the philosopher-
kings) are those who do not want to 
rule but are compelled by a kind of 
judicious awareness of what is best, 
both for themselves as well as the city 
at large (347b-c). Thus, we have come 
to our conclusion: there is a parallel 
between philosophical and tyrannical 
souls and the philosopher’s soul is 
distinguished by a kind of judicious-
madness whereas the tyrant’s soul is 
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